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Brad Larkin |
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Copyright 2001, The Weston Group |
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Introduction |
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Threats |
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Vulnerabilities |
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Securing Vulnerabilities |
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Resources |
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Even non-technical people know that exposing a
computer to the Internet can be dangerous and that we commonly implement a
firewall or proxy server as a barrier. |
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As IT professionals, you should understand the
specific threats posed by hackers on the Internet and how to mitigate those
threats. |
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This class will focus on teaching you critical
first steps to take in modifying the default installation of NT / Win2K for
use on a computer on the Internet. |
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Understand what the DMZ is. |
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Identify the threats on the Internet and why it
is important to always take extra security precautions on Computers on the
Internet. |
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Understand the unique vulnerabilities of Windows
computers on the Internet. |
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Understand the first steps to securing a Windows
computer on the Internet. |
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The term DMZ is coined form the military term,
demilitarized zone. |
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Typically a DMZ is formed under a treaty in
which both sides agree to keep forces out of an a stated area. |
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e.g. A buffer between two forces. |
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In Internet terms, the DMZ is that part of the
Internet which is local to your organization and thus in front of your
firewall. |
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Introduction |
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Threats |
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Vulnerabilities |
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Securing Vulnerabilities |
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Resources |
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We think of the computers on our Internet as
protecting our important information behind the firewall. A hacker sees them merely as a bridge or
portal to accomplish these evils: |
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Information Theft |
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Mischief |
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Denial of Service (DOS) attacks |
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Use of resources for other purposes |
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Spamming, DOS |
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Destruction of Intellectual Property and
Information Systems |
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Location |
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Username |
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Password |
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Vulnerability |
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Target Acquisition |
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Information Gathering |
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Initial Access |
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Privilege Escalation |
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Exploitation |
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Covering Tracks |
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Planting Back Doors |
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Publicizing Vulnerability |
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Ping scans and port scans to identify targets |
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Anonymous Access / Null Sessions for Information
Gathering. |
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Guessing or compromising passwords for Initial
Access and Escalation. |
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Upload of Files, creation of accounts for
Exploitation. |
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Introduction |
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Threats |
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Vulnerabilities |
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Securing Vulnerabilities |
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Resources |
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Remote Sessions cannot execute programs on the
server. (unlike UNIX) |
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HOWEVER, NT Resource Kit provides tools for this
and other hacking functions. |
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Interactive console login rights are restricted
in NT server. |
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Windows source code is not widely available. |
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NTLM password hash is fairly strong. |
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Vulnerabilities can be closed with knowledge and
about an hour’s work. |
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Backward Compatibility and Ease of Use |
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While many aspects of network security apply
across all platforms (changing passwords, auditing, etc.), these items are
special vulnerabilities of Windows: |
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Easy NetBIOS networking / Anonymous Access |
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Easy enumeration of computer and user names. |
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LanManager password hash weakness. |
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Well-established password crackers for the
Windows security account database (aka the SAM). |
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Excessive default permissions for the Everyone
group. |
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By default, Windows NT and 2000 computers come
ready to network, not ready to be secure on the Internet. |
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They allow null session and anonymous access
connections to administrative shares and named pipes. |
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They grant the Everyone group permission to
server root and system root of file system. |
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They make RPC network functionality available to
any computer which can establish a NetBIOS session. |
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Demonstration of NetBIOS null session attack: |
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net use \\x.x.x.x\IPC$ ""
/user:"“ |
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Establishes a named pipe session to the server
x.x.x.x as an anonymous user – part of the Everyone and Guests groups. |
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net view \\x.x.x.x |
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Shows what file shares are available |
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The algorithm for password hash management for
LanManager technology (developed by IBM and used in Windows) has a well
known flaw. |
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LanManager passwords can be easily broken if a
copy of the NT SAM account database file is obtained. |
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Think seconds, not minutes, hours or days! |
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For best protection, LanManager passwords should
be either 7 or 14 characters long. |
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NTLM is stronger technology, NTLMv2 is even
stronger in Windows 2000. But you
must use the registry to prevent use of LanMan hash. |
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The SAM is normally locked during NT operation
and cannot be accessed except through normal login functions. |
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However, a backup copy of the SAM usually is
created by creating an Emergency repair disk. |
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Once a SAM is copied or read, then ALL passwords
are likely exposed! |
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Administrators (you) are usually the worst about
having |
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weak passwords that can be guessed |
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non-changing passwords |
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leaving your password lying around on many
machine SAMs |
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Under default installation of Windows NT or
Windows 2000, the Everyone group has rights to: |
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Full Control on all files and folders |
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The right to ‘traverse’ NTFS permissions |
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e.g. Folder 1 – no rights for Everyone |
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Folder 2 – rights for Everyone – can be accessed
by traversing |
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Log on from the Network |
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Introduction |
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Threats |
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Vulnerabilities |
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Securing Vulnerabilities |
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Resources |
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Concealment - Deny as much information exposure
as possible. |
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Narrow Defense -- limit potential breaches to as
few systems / services as possible. |
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The DMZ itself is an example wherein we try to
isolate the vast majority of our computers behind it. |
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On an Internet computer, we also want to narrow
it’s defense by eliminating all unneccessary systems, accounts, etc. |
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Defense in Depth
-- multiple layers of security. |
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Disable NetBIOS communication and Anonymous
Access |
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Login, Password, and Audit security. |
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Security patches and updates. |
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File System and Registry Permissions. |
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Application Security |
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IIS, FTP, Telnet, Spooler, Alerter, SMTP |
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Networking |
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Registry |
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File System |
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Passwords and Security Policies |
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Apply latest OS and Security Patches |
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General Practices |
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Disable NetBIOS bindings (WINS TCP/IP) on
Internet NIC. |
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Disable vulnerable services unless they’re
needed: |
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Alerter, Spooler, Computer Browser, Messenger,
TCP/IP NetBIOS Helper. |
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Remove the OS2 and POSIX subsystems. (See MS
TechNet for details) |
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Tools: Network Settings dialog, Services dialog,
net commands. |
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See Example sheet |
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Disable anonymous access to resources |
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Hide last username and default domain |
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Upgrade authentication threshold (e.g. no
LanMan) whenever possible. |
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Secure the auto-start portion of registry |
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HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Run &
RunOnce |
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Tools: regedt32, Windows 2000 Security Options
MMC, Brad’s hisecnt4.reg |
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See Example sheet |
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Use complex passwords, at least 7 characters in
length. |
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User Rights – Remove all unnecessary groups from
the “Logon from Network” right.
Remove Everyone group from “Traverse File Permissions” |
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For more powerful options, you can force complex
passwords with passprop.exe from the NT Resource Kit. |
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You can further encrypt the entire system by
running SysKey.exe. |
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Tools: User Manager, passprop.exe (from NTRK),
Win2K Security Templates |
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See Example sheet |
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Use NTFS for C: drive |
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Replace Everyone group with “Authenticated
Users” group. |
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Tools:
convert.exe, cacls.exe |
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Most of what we’ve talked about in this session
has been the inherent vulnerabilities and corrective actions to take for
Windows PCs on the Internet. |
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e.g. The software working as it’s designed to. |
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We’ll not even touch all the highly
sophisticated and sometimes automated threats such as CodeRed. |
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e.g. The software working as it’s NOT designed
to. |
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You must protect against these threats with the
latest patches from Microsoft. |
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ALWAYS PATCH YOUR INTERNET MACHINES FIRST |
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Subscribe to the MS Security Bulletin. |
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Be careful with “test” machines deployed on the
Internet with administrative passwords and very little attention. |
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This is the most common way to penetrate
otherwise well-secured networks. |
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Have someone else test and check your work. |
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Loose lips, white boards, and loose post-it
notes sink IT ships. |
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Always point out security compromises and
vulnerabilities to the client IN ADVANCE. |
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e.g. “We don’t want to have to change our
password” |
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Introduction |
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Threats |
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Vulnerabilities |
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Securing Vulnerabilities |
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Resources |
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hisecNT.reg |
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Makes registry entries to disallow anonymous
access and LanMan hash exchange. |
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Makes other security enhancements found in C2
checklist. |
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FilePermissionsNT |
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Removes Everyone group from C:\ root and root
folders as well as c:\winnt\system32.
Also deletes any backup copies of the SAM. |
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Click here for zipped copy of these and other
files. |
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C2 Security Checklist on MS Technet Site. |
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Hacking Exposed by McClure et al, Osborne
Publishing |
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MS Security Bulletin |
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Quiz over the learning objectives outlined in
this presentation and the resources. |
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